沃顿商学院全套笔记-三十二-

沃顿商学院全套笔记（三十二）

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P68：4_从德梅洛获取的启示.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

What can we learn about power and influence from watching D'Mello in East Team War？

So really， we can learn everything about the course。 This is a man who was good at everything。

but three things in particular I want to point， out flexibility， intentionality， and relationships。

So number one， be multiple。 There are examples throughout the case， the chapters from power。

but a few。 Here， D'Mello was buscular within the Ninesians。

but he was participative with the East Team， Waries。 In other words。

he forced the Indonesians out and was strong with those guys while pulled。

the East Team Waries in and gave away his power to those guys。 The whole notion of team-orization。

which was this building of a co-government， was his。

being coercive with the UN basically breaking their rules in order to seed power to local。

officials。 Other examples， he was able to use direct pressure。

He negotiated directly with the UN in order to pay some families， some reparations， but。

he was also able to negotiate in a very challenging way， but indirectly when he was negotiating。

with Australian government about oil rights off the shore。

These are all examples of his being multiple， being flexible， being able to exert power and。

influence in very different ways。 Samantha Power refers to this as a ruthless pragmatism。

He would do whatever was necessary in order to accomplish his course。 A second takeaway。

recognizing the need for trade-offs。 This example of his prioritizing security over human rights was so against his nature。

so against his career。 Rainbow Sorta quoted in the chapter saying， "Human rights， human rights。

That is Alice in Wonderland。 We have to deal with reality here。 D'Mello agreed with that assessment。

D'Mello traded away essentially the priority on human rights in order to emphasize security。"。

Samantha Power puts it this way。 Sergio started out as a humanitarian。

but by 2003 he had become a diplomat and politician， comfortable weighing lesser evils。

Such a powerful phrase。 What does that phrase mean to you？ Comfortable weighing lesser evils。

This is going to be an important theme in all of our work on power and influence。

The ability to do that and the downsides of doing that and being honest with ourselves。

about when we are doing that。 And then the intentionality that this captures。

you're not really committed to a goal if you're， not making trade-offs。

This is something we see in D'Mello。 His commitment to the goal meant that he had to sacrifice some of his lesser trade-offs。

This is a good illustration of what true intentionality is。 Takeaway number three。

investing in relationships。 So D'Mello put symbolism over convenience consistently。

He was quoted after not letting his driver use a siren when he was stuck in traffic。

I'd rather be late than act like a king。 He prioritized the dignity of the citizens。

Samantha Power says that local staff members were unaccustomed to being treated with such。

respect by foreigners。 And then he in one famous case， quote。

went to the jungle on a second day in country。 He'd spent 24 hours flying into East Timor。

On a second day in the country， he made a visit to the leader of the guerrillas， the。

longtime leader of the resistance， a man who had been imprisoned by the Indonesians from。

1992 until the election in 1999。 Genana Guzman。 He was headquartered in two hours away。

steep mountain roads， unpaved roads。 And on the very second day he was there。

D'Mello got in the jeep， went out there。 He didn't wait for Guzman to come to him。

Many people would have thought， "Well， I'm the king now。 I'm the dictator。

Let the local leaders come to me。"， He realized the importance of that relationship。

a relationship that was going to be vital for， the next two years。 And he took the step。

the non-obvious step， the indirect step of going to the jungle， going。

to Guzman。 So those are three examples， as I said， we could illustrate the entire course that way。

But we also see examples that illustrate a very important construct for us， French and。

Raven sources of power。 So in the next section， we'll unpack French and Raven。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P69：5_弗兰奇和雷文关于社会权力的基础.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

In this section we want to understand where power and authority comes from。

John Gardner puts it this way。 He says， "Leaders cannot maintain authority unless followers are prepared to believe in。

that authority。"， In a sense， leadership is conferred by followers。

It's not something that's demanded or taken。 Rather。

it's conferred by those who would follow the leader。 If effort puts it this way。

formal authority is a source of power if and only if we accede。

to it。 So， this raises the question， if obedience and the acceptance of authority is vital to。

an understanding of politics， why do people obey？ Why and when do they accept authority？

The best take on that and one of the first takes on this comes from French and Raven。

to sociologists who provide a classic model of the basis of social power and they enumerate。

five elements。 Reward power， coercive power， expert power， referent power， and legitimate power。

This framework underlies much of the work in power and influence。

It provides one of the touchstone frameworks for our work。 Let's illuminate it quickly。

A couple of them are rather intuitive。 Reward power and coercive power are exactly as you might expect。

You have reward power if you can provide nice things to other people， whether it's money。

or non-monetary benefits。 Coercive， just the opposite if you're able to hurt them in some way。

French and Raven point out that these things don't necessarily go together in a formal， structure。

You tend to think people have both， if they have reward power， they have coercive power。

they can travel independently。 Some folks have reward power without having coercive and some coercive without having。

reward。 The other three are a little bit more involved so we want to unpack them a little bit and。

we'll go back to D'Mello and look at ways in which D'Mello's behaviors show how these， things work。

Expert power is mostly about confidence。 Performance and reputation based。

This is about someone's functional status， someone knowing something you don't。

This is one of the reasons you see diplomas on doctors' walls， for example， any kind of。

accreditation。 Herb Simon says that this is probably the principal type of authority that operates。

in society in general。 It's that important。 Where do we see it from D'Mello？ Well。

when D'Mello went into East Timor， the resistance leaders there had heard about。

the UN in previous countries， they had heard， for example， that they had come in in Cambodia。

and made a big mess， left a big trail and not really made any difference。

So D'Mello was very sensitive to this。 He knew that not repeating Cambodia meant aggressively establishing functioning government。

structures that made a concrete and lasting difference to citizens。

The emphasis there is the concrete and lasting difference that they had to go out and establish。

a reputation for performance straight away。 A second notion is referent power。

So referent power is an identification with or a feeling of oneness with or a desire for。

that feeling with another person。 So being part of a group， for example。

can give credibility or confidence to the like-mindedness。

An in-group identification can make suggestions by others in the group more attractive。

These are all indications of referent power。 This is something。

an interesting aspect of this source of power is that it's often outside。

the awareness of those who are influenced。 One can be under the sway of referent power without really understanding it。

It's also outside the intentionality of a person who has it。

A person doesn't have to want to be exerting referent power to actually have referent power。

Where do we see D'Mello with this？ Well， his emphasis on language you might think of as a way of cultivating referent power。

He said， "How do you win the sympathy of the people？"， First， you have to learn the language。

Language is the key to a people's culture and culture is the key to a people's heart。

If you force them to speak your language， you will never win their sympathy。

He knew this from his many years working in foreign countries。 It applies， of course。

to language per se in countries， but you might think about it more， generally。

Even if you're speaking English and you're a native English speaker， what does it mean。

to walk into an organization and speak their language？ Organizations have their own languages。

Functional disciplines have their own language。 This is a lesson that we can take and apply in many situations。

Finally， the fifth element of the French and Raven framework is legitimate power。

Legitimate power is about what a person should， when they should obey or they ought to obey。

or a leader has a right to。 It's all of those kinds of elements。

This comes from the fact that most people in most situations are indoctrinated to "play。

according to the rules of the game。"， This is not to say everybody all the time does。

but there's a general inclination that， direction and there's this shadow that follows over that that says you're going to obey those。

who are in positions of authority。 This is especially true in hierarchies or in societies which are more hierarchical。

This is intended to be something that's independent of the other sources of power。

Independence of confidence， independent of the extent to which you identify with someone。

independent of the sanctions they may have， those in authority tend to be granted this。

kind of legitimate power。 There is a kernel of rationale to this。

There's a reason this holds in general。 Those who are higher in hierarchies are there for a reason。

They've earned it in some way， so it makes sense to grant them the authority。

Maybe they have information that you don't have access to。 Again， it would make sense。

But French and Raven are underlining the fact that it happens independently， that it can。

be overgeneralized from that。 Again， this is something that people don't necessarily know that they have。

People in positions of power may not realize why people obey them。

Sometimes it's merely the dent of the office they hold。

DeMally was very sensitive to this kind of thing。 He very much understood the separation between formal power and informal power。

He used participation as a source of legitimacy。 He knew that even though they were the UN。

this great worldwide organization that in， East Timor， their legitimacy was pretty weak actually。

The folks that they considered to be truly in power were the ones that had resisted。

and basically created independence。 They had a very short rope and they had to build legitimacy in some other way。

For example， colored the way he dealt with Guzman。

Guzman had earned that legitimate authority from the citizens and yet somehow DeMally。

had to move it from that military basis to more institutional， constitutional basis。

He had to balance acknowledging Guzman as the de facto leader and not enshrining him。

before there was a way to formally build Congress and build a presidency。

Some subtleties in French and Raven， some details here that are worth noting。

One is that any use of power， especially the coercive element of power， can invoke opposing。

resistance。 It would be in your calculus on when you use these things to know that when you use them。

they will invoke some kind of opposition， especially coercive power。

The idea that these types of power differ in their degree of internalization。

Rewards and punishment tend to be more temporal where the referent and the expert tend to be。

a little longer lasting。 The idea which we stand repeating a few times here is that influence of power does not have。

to be intentional， many people don't understand the ways in which they have power outside。

of their intention just because of who they are or the offices that they hold or the way。

people react to them internationally。 And then finally this notion。

it's a good caution for all of us。 The attempted use of power that is outside that powers range will decrease the power of。

the authority。 This of course is going to put a premium on understanding where does your authority come。

from because you want to be able to use that authority but you don't want to overreach。

that authority。 So this is the framework from French Raven。 Again this is a good foundation for us。

you'll see it in many places。 Even if you don't see it explicitly。

it's underlying much of the research out there。

in power and influence。 These five elements as the bases of social power。 Reward power， coercive。

expert， referent and legitimate。 Thank you。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P7：6_六种生活练习分析.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

In this session we're going to talk about your answers to the six lives exercise。

I've taught this in many different contexts to thousands of people and I've got some。

data that I can share with you about their results as well as some perspectives that。

people have shared with me about their reasons for ranking one life or another either very。

high or very low。 If you haven't had a chance to do the six lives exercise yet， no worries。

Go on to the next session and come back to this one after you've had a chance to do it。

So there are six different people profiled here and I'm just going to talk about each。

one in turn and share some perspectives on the sort of high and the low。

The people who rank this life number one or the people who rank it number six。

And if you didn't rank it either one you just ask yourself whether it was near the top。

of your list or near the bottom and there might be some insights that you can gain from this。

So the first life on the list is the teacher。 The teacher。

if you chose the teacher as your number one life， I think it often signals。

a very passionate perspective on being a mentor， being involved in a small setting where you。

really get to coach people， bring out their excellence。 You're involved with people。

you're involved in a school where you're coaching bright。

students to win science prizes and that sort of perspective feels very satisfying to some， people。

Sometimes though people pick this life last because as you'll remember in the story the。

person who's the teacher has one child who has become estranged from their family。

They no longer in contact， the child doesn't respond to efforts to reach out to them and。

it feels like there's kind of fracture in the home life of this story and people are。

very reluctant to endorse that as a successful life。

Sometimes the people who point to that factor feel that the teacher has a little bit of incomplete。

in the sense that they seem to be able to throw themselves at helping others in their work。

but then when it comes to their own home life and their own children they haven't been able。

to bring that same sense of connection to their home life。

People who again picked the life on the high side look at that factor and say well it wasn't。

really the teacher's choice that the child would become disaffiliated and so they don't。

count that against them as much。 I think with all these lies what you're going to find is that your own experience tends to。

color a good deal which one you pick as closer to the top or closer to the bottom and the。

idea of a sibling or a child that's no longer involved with a family。

If you're experienced with that it's very painful then the chances are that you'll kind。

of push that one to the bottom。 You're not reconciled but then have found a way to get back together again then I think。

you are more of a believer in the healing process and that part of that life feels like。

it's something that can be solved。 At the very least if you ranked it high consider this a sort of signal about your motivations。

for working in smaller groups to affect the lives of others and to bring out other people's。

talents。 Number two life is the banker。 The banker is a single woman with a child who has a severe disability。

She has no partner in her life， adult partner and is a dedicated loyal professional with。

a rather successful career in wealth management。 She has turned her family situation into an asset as she has become a marathon runner。

She's used her running to facilitate a sort of a cause for children with disabilities。

She wheels her kid with her on her marathon runs in a device that she's gotten specially。

rigged up and gets publicity for the cause。 So people who pick this life number one often salute this person's autonomy。

her choices。 All her friends are saying that she should put her child in a home or in a facility and。

get on with her life and her reaction is no no this is my life。 This is provides meaning for me。

And so you feel the courage of the position that she's taken and her certainty and confidence。

in it。 People who pick this life down near the bottom see this sort of the burden aspect of having。

a child with a severe disability as a defining characteristic of this person's life as a。

little too narrow。 And they feel like this would not be a life they would choose because it seems she doesn't。

want to be married。 She doesn't she devoted herself to this one person in her life and it seems kind of restricted。

to them。 So again if you're one of your highest values is loyalty devotion to family then this life。

looks a little more appealing if you're thinking more about autonomy and a career or a life。

with lots of options and the ability to travel extensively and so on。 This one doesn't look so good。

So you know none of them are the right or the wrong answer they're just different values。

that people elicit when they have to answer these questions。

So life number three is the wealthy investor。 Now among all the lives the wealthy investor is the one who has first of all the most autonomy。

The person made a great deal of money on an early investment in their career。

They've then been able to turn to investing that money and to providing themselves with。

the means of carrying out all kinds of hobbies and causes。 They love hang gliding。

They have lots of travel in their lives lots of freedom and then they can even get involved。

in political causes so they give some of their money to political causes that they believe， in。

So they're having a lot of impact on the world around them outside of their little intimate， sphere。

People who pick this life way down at the bottom instead of focusing on all the freedom and。

autonomy look at this life and say this person looks lonely。 They've been married。

It didn't work out。 They've never remarried。 They have no children。 They have no family。

That's discernible from the story and so there's this big missing piece for people。

Now again I actually got an email from an MBA student recently who picked this life and。

said that this life was very appealing to her because freedom is a value that she。

esteemes above all others。 She was actually coming to Wharton from a country where freedom was not always an assumption。

that she could count on。 So when she got here this life felt very appealing。

Other people on the other hand choose this life at the bottom because no family， no family。

only kind of an emotional deficit。 Okay， so that's number three。 Moving on to number four。

the Stone Mason。 So in many ways the Stone Mason's life is the opposite of their wealthy investor's life。

This is a man who has a family， has been married for decades to the same partner， has， children。

some of whom have gone on to do completely different careers than he has。

He builds homes with stone。 They've gone on to be lawyers and so on。

He describes his life in very almost mystical terms。 He sees his day as very much under his control。

He has a kind of craftsman's like ability to just find just the right stone and put it。

in just the right place。 He's built homes for his children and he can drive through his town and see the homes he's。

built。 And so there's a lot of coherence in this life and people who pick it near the top are inclined。

to salute that sort of embrace of family， embrace of craft， embrace of controlling the。

experience they're having in their life。 Very integrated。

People who pick it down near the bottom often see this as a life with very little scale。

This person is only affecting their family。 They're only affecting a few people in their community with the homes they build。

He builds and they want to have a bigger impact on the world。

Plus there seems to be no recognition outside of this person to his skill。

So there's not even an award from Stonemason Weekly that he was Stonemason of the week。

He's just an average guy who builds pretty good homes。 So again。

if your success values are more oriented toward the family， toward integration， then。

this one's going to rank very high。 If they're oriented more toward impact on others and scale as well as a sort of autonomy。

and options， then this one doesn't seem quite as appealing。

I did have one executive once comment to me about this life because in a class I might。

pick one person who picked it number one and they described why they liked it and one person。

who picked it number six and they described why they didn't。 It was in a big group。

a hundred people in the room and someone who just described the。

Stonemason in rather disparaging terms and why they picked it number six。

This man stood up in the back of the room and I think he was from a very strong spiritual。

background because he stood and said， "The Stonemason is having a tremendous effect， on society。

The Stonemason is building a society as he builds his homes and that he is the foundation。

for his family。"， So this very poetic view of the implications and the symbolism for this life。

Anyway， this is one that elicits a lot of different emotions from people when they take， it。

Life number five is the tennis pro。 Now the tennis pro of all of the different lives is the one person that actually appeared。

on the cover of a magazine。 It's clear that she is a very accomplished professional on the circuit and has been acknowledged。

and recognized for this very important accomplishment and is so therefore has this sort of success。

in the traditional sense very， very well outlined and defined。 She also has a family partner。

They couldn't have children of their own so she adopted children。

She has a little tennis camp that she's running that gives underprivileged kids a chance to。

experience tennis and learn the skills that come with that。

So people who like this life put it higher often focus on all those attributes and have。

a very positive feeling for the combination of things that she's bringing to her life。

On the other hand， people who rank it down to the bottom point to other aspects of this， vignette。

One of which is she complains that she's so busy with her profession that she doesn't。

have time to be with her kids as much as she would like because she has to be on the road。

They see this as maybe a difficulty in her work-life balance。

She's not choosing the right priorities。 And then there's a sense the way the story is written although it's not explicit that。

maybe this person didn't choose tennis and it could just be that she was the product of。

a tiger mother or gorilla father household and they drilled her and drilled her and drilled。

her when she was a kid， didn't have a choice， she just had to do it and then she just had。

an aptitude for it and she got to be really good at tennis but the sense that she didn't。

choose it herself does not appeal to some people。 They feel like she's more of a victim maybe than a success。

So depending on which part of that story resonates with you， you might have picked it higher。

or lower。 The final life of the six is a nonprofit executive。

The nonprofit executive has got his own unique features。

The first is that this person has had a successful career in finance and now has turned it and。

has gone into a nonprofit environment where they're working for a religious group， a very。

strong belief system that they have。 So they're repurposing their professional skills toward a greater cause that appeals。

to some people。 In addition， they are now turning their attention to a very important cause in Africa。

clean， water in villages in rural Africa and they're about to take their whole family over there。

and lead the effort to handle this initiative and help others。

That feels very appealing to some people who want to have an impact and do good in the， world。

People who choose this life at the bottom， again， focus on a different part of the story。

They see all that but this person is taking children who， some of whom are in high school。

away from their social environments， they don't want to go。

He's taken them to Africa anyway with his spouse and they feel this is just a time bomb。

of a family about ready to explode in rural Africa and not at all something that you would。

define as successful。 So again， depending on your hopes， fears and fantasies。

as well as your experience， you， focus on different aspects of this life and either favor it or disfavor it。

I had a very interesting experience。 I did this exercise with a group up in Boston and we got through all the lives and I was。

calling on people and asking them why they chose one or the other。

And a young lady who was in the front row had picked a nonprofit executive as the sixth。

out of six lives and I said， "Well， what was the problem for you with this life？"， And she said。

"Very passionately。"， "Well， my mother and father were both evangelical ministers。

They dragged us everywhere they went。 They never cared about us。

I would never choose this life for anybody。"， And everybody is sort of taken with this passion that she spoke with。

So these lives are impossible to judge， of course， because they're very sketchily drawn。

And so what you're really doing is reading your life story into each of them and depending。

on what aspects of your life story resonate as success values， those are the lives that。

seem to be the ones that are appealing。 Those are the ones for others who fear them and don't choose them。

So just for some additional perspective， first， you may not be surprised to know that every。

single time I give this exercise to any group of people， 20 or more， there is someone in。

the audience who chooses each of the lives as number one and there is someone in that。

audience who chooses each of those lives as number six。

So this begins to help you see the point that success is not something that has an objective。

function。 This is something you get to choose and it's your perceptions， your values， your history。

your experience， your family that is going to be the foundation for your own vision of。

what a successful life is because they all get picked and make people feel equally strongly。

about each of them。 Just one last bit of data for what it's worth is I've given this online to。

it's available， online and thousands of people have taken it and it basically。

the results online with， that many people taking it have fallen into three tranches， three sets。

The top two lives that people pick most often are the teacher and the stonemason and they're， tied。

It's not one over the other。 So people seem to value the family part， the mission part。

the autonomy part in some way， that those two lives embody。

The bottom two lives that people pick and this is a big gap between the top and the bottom。

are the wealthy investor and the banker。 I think it's interesting that both of those lives are the ones with the most pared down。

vision of family。 The banker has no family。 The banker has one person in their family but no spouse and no interest in marrying and。

the wealthy investor has no children and no spouse and no interest in marrying。

There is a defining feature of the choices people are making and family seems to be one。

of the biggest factors that people weigh when they actually give success some deeper thought。

and then of course the non-profit executive and the tennis player both occupy the middle。

zone but it fascinates me that they're tied they're basically two at the top two in the。

middle two at the bottom。 So your answers are yours。

They are valid and the most important thing is to try to gain some insight about yourself。

from which ones you picked。 I just want to give you one last challenge that I give to my students at the end of this。

exercise and it may cause you to think about it differently or not。 That depends。

But let me give you one last question。 Suppose that you died and went to heaven or whatever afterlife you can imagine and you。

went to check in to the everlasting life and the deity there looked on you with compassion。

and said well you know welcome but I have one final task for you that you have to do before。

you're allowed to check in and that is this。 You need to take one of the six lives in the six lives exercise and you need to give it。

to your only child。 So the problem you now face is which of these six lives would you endow to your only child。

the person you would want the best for the person that you care the most about。

And when I put that question to people very often as many as half of them sometimes a。

little more change their vote for number one。 People who voted for the stonemason changed their vote to the teacher or to the wealthy。

investor or someone else。 People who voted for the wealthy investor changed their vote to the nonprofit executive。

or someone else。 And I think the reason that people change not all do some people stick with the same。

vote they had them at the beginning but the reason they change their vote is because when。

you're asked to give one of these lives to someone you love who has a life in front of。

them it stops being a question of just what's your ideal or what's sort of the perfect picture。

of success in a theoretical way and becomes something where you want the person to have。

options you want them to have financial security you want them to be safe。

And I think that's a different question and I think it's a more important one because。

inside each of you there is someone who is trying to protect you and make sure that your。

life works and make sure that you make choices that will allow you to prosper。

And you're not just going off and living some life that you think is ideal or has some theoretical。

properties you're picking and making choices to sustain you to the next choice point。

And so I think it's worth thinking about because the chances are that your actual theory of。

success has more to do with this second question because that will describe more accurately。

the actual choices that you're making in your life and not just a theoretical point。

So as you contemplate this exercise and we'll come back to it periodically during the course。

you might just come to terms with what your values actually are what your choices actually。

are and don't get lost in the fog of thinking about some perfect world that you could never。

actually make choices in make real life choices in。

So with that we've come to the end of our first exercise and now we're going to dig。

deeper a little bit into the next session and see what happens to success when you unpack， it。

Thank you。 。

[BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P70：6_你的看法.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

What a wrap up with an observation by Robert Kelly who wrote a book in 1998 called "How。

to Be a Star" it worked a little bit of a cheesy title。 Fantastic book though。

can highly recommend it。 He went into this work trying to understand what separates the star performers from middle。

performers。 His hypothesis was more or less a conventional wisdom。

They're going to be different in some fundamental way that they will be smarter， they'll be。

brains or they'll be better in person， they'll be schmoozers or they'll just work harder。

they'll be workaholics perhaps。 They tested for all of these things and found that these fundamental dispositions didn't。

separate stars from middle performers。 Instead， they doubled their efforts。

they observed more closely and they found that it was patterns， of behavior on the job。

That stars and middle performers in fact exercised many of the same strategies but they ranked。

their importance differently， they prioritized these behaviors differently and they described。

them differently。 One of the most important takeaways from this work is that it's not a DNA test that separates。

star performers from middle performers but rather their strategies and their strategies。

essentially available to everybody。 Jeff Efreber puts it the following way。

"Our goal in studying power and influence， our， goal here in the class is to convince you that you can actually acquire power not by becoming。

a new individual but by doing some things slightly more strategically and differently。"。

So this puts the focus back on you and this is going to be a big theme in the class。

This is a very personal class and we want you to stop and reflect on what does it mean。

to you and what do you want to change as a result。 So let's start with a few questions。

What is one strength of yours in this space？ What's one method you can effectively influence others？

What is kind of your go-to move in influencing other people？ This is a starting place for you。

This is where you can get some traction。 But as important， perhaps more important。

what is one weakness of yours？ What is the method you see others use for influence that you have trouble with that you。

might start stretching on and try to improve on？ And then finally。

what is one thing you'd like to create， change， or accomplish that。

requires as much influence as you can muster？ This is kind of the motivation for the course。

What would you like to do out there？

What are the goals out there， the ambitions out there that you need power and influence。

in order to accomplish？ What about you？ Finally， leave you with a thought from Kelly。 Again。

illustrated here with Sergio de Melo。 It isn't what these stars had in their head that made them stand-outs。

but how they used， what they had。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P71：7_状况感知能力.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

We're going to start this section with a quick test。

We've embedded a video here and the video includes people passing a ball， bounce passing。

a ball to each other。 And we want you to count the number of passes you see by people in white shirts。

That's your task。 Watch the video， only last about a minute， minute and a half。

Count the number of passes you see by people wearing white shirts。 Here we go。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。

So how many passes did you see？ It's a hard task， people vary， come up with different numbers。

But in fact， this test wasn't about counting passes。 This test was what else you might have noticed。

Did you see anything else？ Anything interesting happen in that video？

Let's go back and look at a particular segment。 And this time， look more broadly。

what happens in here besides passing balls。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。

That time you surely saw that there's a person in a gorilla suit that walks out。

beats his or her chest and walks off the screen。 Amazingly。

a high percentage of people who watch this video trying to count passes， don't see the gorilla。

It's a remarkable demonstration。 Simon's and Shabri re-prized this demonstration from a classic study in the 70s。

To show and to investigate this issue of change blindness。

How people can neglect change that happens in their environment because they're so。

focused on a particular task。 This， we think， is important to understanding what happens in organizations。

And so it's a good starting place for us and introduces this concept of situation， awareness。

To dive into this， let's take a quote from David Foster Wallace at a commencement。

speech a few years ago who told the following story。 He said。

there are these two young fish swimming along and。

they happen to meet an older fish swimming the other way。 Who nods at them and says。

born a boy's has the water。 They go on， the young fish swim on for a bit and。

then eventually one of them looks over at the other and goes， what the hell is water？

This captures how we take for granted our environment。

Even essential elements like the water that fish live in。 If we're not paying attention。

it can fade into the background。 And importantly， this can dramatically affect our ability to function and。

understand what's going on。 So we're going to dive a little bit more deeply into this。

There's a concept of situation awareness。 Quote here from the former CEO of Delta Airlines。

Richard Anderson。 He says， leadership is like flying an airplane。

You have to have your head up and you have to have situational awareness of。

everything that's going on around you。 He didn't use that term accidentally。

It's a phrase that has been around for decades now。 And the definition sounds a little technical。

but bear with me， situational awareness is the perception of elements in the environment。

within a volume of time and space。 The comprehension of their meaning and。

the projection of their status into the near future。 So this was originally a military concept。

If you've been in the military and know some of the military， you may have heard them talk about SA。

They get drilled on SA all the time， situational awareness。

Because of how important it is in their operations。 It went from military to aviation and on and。

heavy operations and increasingly we're seeing industries like hospitals for， example。

emphasize situational awareness among their employees。

So we're going to extend it from military and， industrial navigation to political navigation。

Because it is such a useful concept and understanding what happens in organizations。

So one way of simplifying the concept is to think about how elements in your。

environment change over time。 How do they increase or decrease in importance？

How do they increase risk？ How does uncertainty change？

These pieces are going to be critical for surviving and navigating well in an， organization。

So one way to think about it， just think about situations along two dimensions。

Important to unimportant and familiar to unfamiliar。

Some situations are important but familiar so you're on pretty solid ground。

Some situations really aren't that important so it doesn't matter that much。

But there are those situations which are both important and。

unfamiliar where SA becomes terrifically important。

And you need to be sensitive to when you're in those kinds of situations。

So you can take a little more care to understand risk， uncertainty。 What is moving around？

What is driving actions in those situations？ So this particular quadrant。

important yet unfamiliar is especially critical for， you。

There was a study a few years ago by Lawrence Gonzalez， an author who was。

interested in why accidents happen in natural environments。

How people die in avalanches are quite water rafting。

These situations in seemingly recreational areas that go wrong in some way。

And he wrote a very interesting book called Deep Survival。

And towards the end of that he quotes a survival instructor who says。

we come from cities and learn to expect things to stay the same。

But they don't and it kills us quickly or slowly。 So this was more or less his summary of why these things went wrong in the wild。

That people weren't aware that situations could change。

They weren't accustomed to situations changes as the survival instructor says。

In our cities and our day to day lives they don't change。

Yet out here they do and because people aren't paying attention it gets them in trouble。

This is why we want to emphasize situational awareness。

This is why we want to start out emphasizing situational awareness because it's the。

changes in your organizational environment， your political environment that will really。

get you in trouble。 It's the complacency that sets in and kind of decreases your vigilance that will get。

you in trouble。 You counterbalance that by emphasizing situational awareness。

A leader who was well known， got a lot of credit for situational awareness is John Kennedy。

At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis he said about trying to figure out what to。

do with the Soviet Union。 He says， it isn't the first step that concerns me but both sides escalating to the fourth。

and fifth step。 And we don't go to the sixth because there's no one around to do so。

It was this kind of reasoning that helped Kennedy navigate the Cuban Missile Crisis。

And it's that kind of situational awareness we want you to pick up on。

So in the next section we'll drop more deeply into the Cuban Missile Crisis。 Thank you。

[BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P72：8_古巴导弹危机案例.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 marked the height of the Cold War。

By all accounts， it is the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war。

This was a showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union over new missile installations。

in Cuba。 And people have used it to better understand how and why countries act the way they do。

And we can borrow the frameworks used there to understand why organizations more generally。

do what they do。 So let's first run through at a very high level what happened in the Cuban Missile Crisis。

So this was the Kennedy administration。 He had come into office in 1960。 The Bay of Pigs fiasco。

you almost never say Bay of Pigs without adding fiasco， was the。

year before in one of his first years in office。 And so Cuba had been an issue for the Kennedy administration from the beginning。

And in the fall of 1962 in a routine spy plane flight over Cuba， they discovered the， U。S。

discovered missile sites there。 And this was a great concern because of how close Cuba is to the U。

S。 and so immediately， the administration starts gathering and figuring out what they should do。

So over the next 13 days this crisis unfolded and we're just going to quickly summarize。

what happened and then in the next section we'll drop more deeply into the details underneath。

that and why we think it happened the way it did。 So Kennedy gathered this administration on the 16th of October to consider a response。

The debate in the administration was between the doves and the hawks。

This was the beginning of the term dove versus hawk actually。

There were those who wanted to use diplomacy and there were those who wanted to use military。

options including possibly a ground invasion in Cuba。 But at the very least a surgical airstrike。

So this was the big debate in the administration and of course it all leaned heavily on what。

they believed the Soviets would do in response to however the U。S。 responded。

So one of the critical moments was on the 17th that our intelligence services， U。S。

intelligence services determined that these were intermediate range nuclear missiles meaning。

they could reach all the way to the Pacific Northwest all the way up to Washington state。

So essentially the entire lower 48 of the U。S。 were within range of the missiles that were。

being installed in Cuba。 It's obviously a critical moment for security。

Kennedy had put together what became known as X-COM， executive committee of advisors。

It was run more or less by his brother Robert Kennedy who was attorney general and interestingly。

in the early meetings the feeling was that the group wasn't speaking as freely with Kennedy。

there so Kennedy excused himself from the rest of them so they could debate more freely。

But over the next few days X-COM was where the real decisions got hashed through or not。

the decisions but at least the key in the decisions for Kennedy。

Eventually they decided on a blockade。 The blockade was a middle route。

A blockade was setting up the navy some miles off of Cuba to prevent additional materials。

to come into Cuba。 It wasn't clear yet that they had everything they needed and so they didn't want any more。

Soviet ships reaching Cuba and they were going to do that with a naval blockade。

This was considered a middle option between mere diplomacy and something more aggressive。

like surgical strikes。 So Kennedy makes a televised speech。

It was one of the bigger moments in Kennedy's administration to announce that these missiles。

existed and that the US was going to take action。 They sent the ambassador to the UN to challenge the Soviet Union over this and Kennedy also。

ordered low level flights instead of the high level U2 flights， low level flights to get。

closer pictures so they can better understand what was going on there。

On October 24th the real height of this crisis was reached when the Soviet ships got to the。

quarantine line， the blockade line。 No one knew what they would do。

No one knew if they were going to run the blockade or if they would stop and honor the， blockade。

So this was when on the next day the US reached DEF CON 2 which is the military preparedness。

and awareness is the highest it's ever been。 It's the closest we've ever been to actually being in nuclear war。

This was also when we got back， the US military got back， the low level reconnaissance pictures。

and figured out for sure that there were missiles already there。

They didn't have to wait to come in on the ships that were already there and they were。

very close to being prepared for use if they wanted to use them。 On the 26th。

Khrushchev who was the premier of the Soviet Union sent a letter proposing。

an exchange that if the US would promise not to invade Cuba that Russia would， the Soviet。

Union would pull out the missiles。 This was preserving a victory of sorts for Khrushchev and it was a bit of an opening。

for the US administration。 Not this time some other things go a little bit wrong so for example completely unrelated。

to the Cuban Missile Crisis， a YouTube plane， a spy plane flew over Russia， it was shot。

down over Russia because it flew off course which was to say the least horrible timing。

for US-Soviet relations。 And about this time a second letter came across supposedly from Khrushchev that was much more。

bellicose， did not provide an opening for an exchange and those on the US side were left。

wondering what's the difference。 Why the more friendly exchange。

the first time in the more bellicose exchange， the second。

time there clearly was discord among the Soviets on what was going on and how they should respond。

Kennedy's way of dealing with this and the administration's way of dealing with this。

was to respond to the first letter， to basically ignore the second letter and to take Khrushchev。

up on his exchange， on his offer for an exchange。 And in fact there's this wrinkle in there where the US had military installations and。

hungry， missiles and hungry that were obsolete and they were about ready to pull them out。

anyway and they offered to as a part of this exchange remove those missiles from hungry。

But they also said they wouldn't say that publicly， they couldn't be seen doing that， publicly。

they would just， they promised that they would get it done。

And so essentially Kennedy and Khrushchev reached this exchange and on the 28th of October。

Khrushchev announced the removal of all missiles from Cuba and the crisis was averted。

Incredibly tense time。 People have used it from all disciplines， people have used this moment。

these 13 days， to understand politics and organizations and we think we can learn a lot about understanding。

politics and power and influence from studying it。

So in the next section we'll drop it a little more deeply into the details。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P73：9_艾莉森关于权力的三种模式.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

In 1969， political scientist Graham Allison published a profoundly influential paper called。

"Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis。"。

His motivation was to suggest that there were multiple ways we could understand why countries。

do what they do。 And yet， political science had only focused on one of those ways。

So he used the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study to better understand， to illuminate。

three different models you could bring to explaining international behavior， governmental， behavior。

So the three models， we'll go to each of these in more details， but the three models were。

model one， the rational analysis， model two， organizational process， and model three， bureaucratic。

politics。 So， model one， rational policy， rational analysis。 In this model。

the national government is a unitary actor。 So there's no dispersion of interest underneath it。

It's just a solitary actor。 You can think of it as a person， essentially， a single solitary actor。

And then that actor is rational。 This is a critical bit。

There's no room for biases or misunderstanding of lack of information。

This is a rational decision maker。 And each action you observe then is part of a strategic objective。

according to some plan， to accomplish the goal。 And this has been the default way of analyzing governmental behavior。

So in the Cuba case， how might that explain what we observed？

So consider the options that the US had in responding to discovering these missiles in， Cuba。

They could do nothing。 That wasn't going to happen。 They could use diplomacy。

which was one option that was definitely debated。 They could approach Cuba secretly to see if they could work out a deal。

They could use the blockade， which is ultimately what they decided。

They could have used surgical airstrikes， which was probably the single most heavily considered。

alternative to the blockade。 Or they could do a full-scale invasion。

What does the rational model say about what we observe？ Well。

it suggests that it was the rational choice to do the blockade。

It was best because it was the middle course of action， not as extreme as either diplomacy。

or military intervention。 It put the onus back on Khrushchev。

So the Kennedy administration felt the burden of choice here。

And they might have wanted to return it back to Khrushchev and find out what he wanted， to do。

And then it limits the engagement。 This was a critical part of the debate there。

that it's not as big a commitment， obviously， as involving your military。

So there's a little bit of an engagement， enough of an engagement to so that they're serious。

but not a full-scale engagement。 And then finally and importantly。

it showed that the US has a military advantage， especially， in this part of the world。

So on conventional military arms at this time， the US had an advantage， and it would demonstrate。

that and that would be an important signal to the Soviet Union as they decided how they。

wanted to respond。 So there are all these rational reasons and there's a single interest that the government。

wanted to accomplish， and that would help us explain what happened。 But that's only one way。

Another model， this is where Allison really starts digging in， is what he called organizational。

process。 And in this model， the government is not a unitary actor。 It's a semi-futile。

loosely-aligned organization。 So you can think of it as， you know， you've got different departments。

you've got different， interests， you've got different groups trained in different ways。

and they may not all have， the same way of thinking about things。

They may not even have all the same interests。 In this model， the governmental actions are outputs。

They're not a choice an organization makes。 It's just an output of a routine as they went about their business。

Interestingly， few problems in organizations， especially governments， are strictly the domain。

of a single part of the organization。 They're factored。

They get divided into split-across organizations。 And this can lead to difficulty in coordination。

at least to factionalization。

And it emphasizes that this isn't in fact a choice the organization's making as much。

as just the outcome of these factionalized parts of the organization going about their， business。

So there's a great quote Allison has in this article。 He says。

"The best explanation of an organization's behavior at T is T minus one。"， What he means by that is。

if you want to understand why an organization did what they did today。

just look at what they did yesterday。 There's so much inertia。

There's so much routine in an organization that a lot of what we observe at any given。

moment is just a product of what they've been doing。 So how does this explain Cuba？

What organizational routines influence the outcome here？

So one set of routines were around intelligence gathering。

So there were bits of information that were collected by various intelligence agencies。

Lumber ships rode very high in the water。 That was odd because lumber ships should be full of lumber and therefore they should。

be low in the water。 There was a Cuban and a bar ranting about what was going on down there。

There was a view at one point of a missile profile。

But these were in different parts of the organization。 There was no routine for aggregating those。

And so they never rose up into some conclusion。 This anticipates some of the critique of the intelligence community at 9/11 as well。

The routines just weren't built for aggregating into a solitary organization。

There was a delay in scheduling surveillance flights due to interagency conflict。

The intelligence agencies wanted to fly the planes but the military organizations wanted。

to fly the planes。 And until they could get that settled they didn't fly the planes。

And so they gathered intelligence more slowly than they would have otherwise。

And then in one of the most profound examples the configuration of the Soviet missile bases。

made a difference here。 So here's a map and this actually comes from the lower level reconnaissance flights that。

took place later in the crisis。 But you can see the installation here。

And this is a close up version of what they observed on the first day of the crisis when。

they thought there might be missile installations in Cuba。 How did they know that？

They knew that because each of the elements of this missile site， the tanks， the trucks。

the tents that cover the missile materials are laid out in the exact same way in Cuba as。

they are at every other Soviet missile site in the world。

So there is a routine the Soviet military had for setting up missile sites。

The commander that is in charge here locally gets there。 His materials arrive。

He opens up the Soviet handbook for how to set up a missile site and he starts following， the plan。

That routine made it trivial really for the U。S。 to diagnose when they saw this picture。

that this was a Soviet missile site。 Purely the product of organizational process。 Other examples。

So analysis， at one point the U。S。 considered these mobile missiles。

They classified them as mobile missiles。 And that changed the way the administration thought about how they should respond because。

they thought if they're mobile they're going to move as we deploy surgical strikes。

But it turned out that was merely a semantics essentially that even though it was called。

mobile it wasn't so mobile that the strikes wouldn't have worked and yet it affected the。

decision making at the most important moment the decision making of the U。S。 government。

The processes around implementing the blockade。 So for example in a moment that's caught in the movie 13 days which is a fantastic movie。

about this whole thing。 The naval blockade， there's a certain way naval blockades are set up。

They've been done the same way for essentially centuries and yet the kid of the administration。

wanted to set them up differently。 The kid of the administration wanted to set them up closer to the country to give the Soviet。

more the Soviets more time。 They wanted more distance between the ships and the blockade。

They wanted to give the Soviets more chance to turn around essentially。

This was a major point in contention with the Navy because as they said we've been setting。

up blockades since the days of John Paul Jones and they were reluctant to do it differently。

even though it was fundamental to how the U。S。 navigated this crisis。

And then finally there were all these routinized activities that sent kind of false signals。

about what was going on。 We mentioned the U2 flight over Russia。

Also there was a nuclear test often in the Pacific theater that was again completely unrelated。

to what was going on between the U。S。 and Soviets and Cuba。 But how would the Soviets know that？

As one person said in fact this was Kennedy。 There's always one son of a bitch who doesn't get the message。

Just routines just organizational processes but dangerously provoking the situation as， a result。

The third model that Allison suggests is bureaucratic politics。

And in this model policy is the outcome of bargaining games。

Heath in this model thinks about organizations as participants， players with different positions。

interest， ambitions and where you are。 What position you're in。

what placement the organization influences your decision。

And the outcome rather than a solitary actor making a single rational decision is just this。

output of all these different negotiations。 So a quote he has here that captures it well is where you stand depends on where you sit。

This I hope begins to demonstrate to you the connection between this military governmental。

situation and your organization because we think things like this greatly apply to most。

organizations where you stand depends on where you sit。 So some examples here from this case。

What were the interest and abilities of the key players here？

This whole event carried extra weight for Kennedy because he was mid term。

He was a couple just a little bit more， two years away from election， a year away from。

the campaign beginning。 He had been seen as weak among his critics on military matters and so he faced this extra。

risk of anything on the diplomatic side of things because of the political consequences。 Moreover。

the Bay of Pigs still loomed large for them。 This was a complete fiasco in his first year in office and that meant that there was extra。

weight on this crisis as well。 And then there were key alliances within the organization。

So probably the most important was between Kennedy and his brother Robert， the attorney， general。

What if Robert Kennedy had been in favor of bombing？

Would that have made a bigger difference than the advocates that did exist were typically。

military guys。 The president Kennedy was closer to his brother than the military leaders so the fact that。

Robert Kennedy was inclined that way probably made a difference。

What if McNamara hadn't been reluctant to employ the military？

McNamara was the secretary of defense and again somebody that had a lot of influence over， Kennedy。

McNamara was slow。 He was reluctant to engage the military in the way that the actual military leaders wanted。

them engaged。 So it seems like in this situation the individuals。

the dispositions of the individuals and the alliances。

they had made a very big difference in what happened。

So when you approach problems with a model three mindset you not only navigate the politics。

of your own organization but it helps you understand the politics of the other organization。

perhaps， the organization that you're negotiating with。

So this led to Kennedy responding to the first of Christchoff's messages， not the second。

of Christchoff messages。 There are tapes of the conversations of the ex-com meetings where advisors are trying to。

they're advocating different views of what's going on in the Soviet Union and they're trying。

to understand how can you reconcile the first message with the second。

And some of them come to believe， "Well， we think Christchoff is in this position。

He has these interests。 He has these constraints and the best way to get to him is to ignore the second letter。

appeal to the first and that kind of reasoning helped Kennedy offer the exchange and ultimately。

encourage persuade Christchoff to pull missiles out of there。"， So to recap。

Allison's models of organizational politics which we're talking about here in。

governmental situations because we think they're relevant in a non-governmental model one。

rational analysis， this model explains an outcome as the optimal response for the organization。

as a whole to a specific set of conditions and objectives very rational and this has。

been the traditional way of thinking about organizations。 Model two， organizational process。

This model explains an outcome as the result of systemic pressures and routinized behavior。

The key to applying this framework is to think of an outcome as being the byproduct of activities。

the byproduct of activities and imperatives not specifically intended to produce that outcome。

And then model three， bureaucratic politics。 The model explains outcomes as a product of the accumulated preferences and strategies。

of people or sub-organizations。 Sometimes negotiations are between parts of the organization making up an organization。

So here's a quick summary。 You could think about the logic of these models being rational in model one。

routine in model， two and bargaining， rational routine or bargaining。

You can think about the locus of them bearing as well。 Model one。

the locus is the organization as a whole。 Model two is more the division or function and then model three is more the individual。

And you can also think about what they manifest。 Model one manifests choice of the organization。

Model two is more an output， more byproduct and model three is more an outcome。

All these individual bargains， negotiations going on bubble up to an outcome for the organization。

[BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P74：10_启示.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

So， what are the implications of this model for you as you think about your organization。

and the organizations you're trying to navigate and negotiate with？ So first。

the models reveal sources of power and constraints on power。

So each of these models point out ways in which decisions get made。 Those are opportunities。

but they're also limitations。 So this suggests that savvy analysis requires using multiple perspectives。

One of the reasons this is so important is that we tend to bring a particular lens to， situations。

We tend to have chronic ways of thinking about situations。 So。

Allison's entire motivation was to push the field of political science away from their。

chronic lens of rational analysis。 What is your chronic lens？

Do you tend to think of organizations and actions as rational actions？

Some of you might have a chronic lens of bureaucratic politics。

You think all of it is fed up from the individual bargains that are cut at the lower levels。

And then few of us， and we're going to emphasize this more， few of us have this middle model。

this model to， this routinized process where a lot of organizations' behavior is just， inertia。

It's just routine。 But it's not a very interesting one。 So it usually doesn't draw our attention。

We don't tend to explain behavior that way。 Allison's point is we're going to better understand organizations if we bring multiple perspectives。

if we move from one to the other as we try to understand what happened or predict what。

is going to happen in the future。 This is connected a little to some recent research by Phil Tetlock。

Tetlock is now here at the University of Pennsylvania。

This book was written when he was at Berkeley。 And it was a unique study of judgment in the field of psychology。

Usually when judgment study in psychology， especially historically， it's done with experimental。

research， often using students。 And they're short， they're short little stimuli。

Tetlock did something quite unusual。 He decided to study the judgment of real world experts。

economists， political commentators， political scientists about real world problems。

Things like what's going to happen in South Africa， what's going to happen with the dissolution。

of the Soviet Union， what's going to happen in future elections， where is the economy going？

So over a 10-year period of time， which at the time was unheard of to study judgment this， way。

over a 10-year period of time， Tetlock captured people's predictions and then followed。

what actually happened in the world to figure out how good they were at making these predictions。

And what he found was that there is rampant overconfidence。

The overconfidence we observe in the lab， we also observe in the real world。 And importantly。

he was trying to understand what distinguishes those who are overconfident。

from those who are well calibrated。 And he couldn't find anything。

Nothing that you might think would predict that。 Education， political orientation， gender。

these things don't relate to that。 He did find one difference though。

and he called it cognitive style。 And he differentiates what he called foxes barring framework from Irving Berlin。

foxes， from hedgehogs。 This actually differentiated those who are overconfident from those who are better calibrated。

What does he mean by it？ Hedgehogs， Tetlock says， are thinkers who know one big thing。

They aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains。

They display bristly impatience with those who don't get it and express considerable confidence。

that they are already pretty proficient forecasters， at least in the long term。 Foxes。

on the other hand， are， Tetlock says， thinkers who know many small things， tricks， of the trade。

They're skeptical of grand schemes。 They see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises。

but rather exercises in， flexible ad hocory that requires stitching together diverse sources of information。

And these judges are rather different about their own forecasting ability。

This is the big distinction， and this is the only distinction he found that predicts good。

judgment in these real world， meaningful situations。

We bring it up now because foxes are exactly the kind of folks that would use all three。

levels from Allison's models。 Foxes are those who don't go to the map believing in Model 1 or go to the map believing in Model。

3。 They think， "Well， I need to look at these situations from multiple perspectives。

I'm going to be a better judge of what happens next if I bring multiple lenses to this situation。"。

Finally on the implications for Allison's models， not all models are equally appreciated。

My hypothesis is that while Model 1 has been long dominant in political analysis and many。

of us obsess on Model 3， especially in our own organizations， we're all too familiar。

with the bureaucratic negotiations that go on in the hours。

We sometimes might neglect what happens in other organizations， but we tend to think。

some about Model 3。 What really gets neglected is Model 2， these organizational processes。

You might think just to make it a little more real， what are some examples in your organization。

where routinized processes are driving what you guys are doing？

Routineized processes would be the best explanation of why some outcome occurs or some decision。

is made。 Over time， I've collected some examples from students of these things。

They talk about things like the British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf a few years ago， how。

BP responded to that， some of the MMS licensing issues that led to it in the first place， how。

the government responded after Katrina， Hurricane Katrina in 2005。

A lot of it was just routinized behavior， not well adapted to the circumstances that were。

taking place then。 The intelligence gathering that took place before and after 9/11。

these are all governmental， examples， but there are non-governmental examples as well。 In hospitals。

many routinized procedures in hospitals and for good reason， sometimes they。

have those procedures in order to protect downsides， but so much becomes routinized as， a result。

An example some students gave a few years ago was campus recruiting。 At the time。

I was at Yale and some students said， "I'd like to think that these organizations。

come and they recruit at Yale because we're the best school， but it could just be， in。

fact I'm sure it is in some cases， just because that's what they've been doing。"。

Or somebody said it in motion 10 years ago because they were close or they knew somebody。

and now it's just the way things are done。 We have examples of students who work in newspaper。

how much of newspaper's operations are just， built around that daily cycle of producing the newspaper。

So again， pushing you on this kind of underappreciated aspect of what happens in organizations。

It's underappreciated model for why organizations do what they do， what organizational processes。

are driving your organization， what organizational processes might you attend to if you want to。

influence what happens in organizations。 We have one more implication and it doesn't flow as immediately from Allison as from all。

of the psychology research that's come since Allison and that is don't forget about chance。

A danger of the framework that Allison is suggesting is that you can fully explain what happened。

but if you fully explain what happens， you're going to leave out the role of chance and that's。

going to make you a bad predictor of what happens in the future because there's always。

a lot of uncertainty in chance in what happens in the future。 So one last admonition。

don't forget about chance。 So it turns out that even those in the administration at the time were thinking about chance。

There was a group， I mentioned before that this was where the terms hawks and doves comes， from。

but in subsequent analysis people have talked about there's kind of an owlish group。

neither hawk nor dove。 This included McNamara， Bundy and Ball and it came from the weight that they assigned to。

the risk of desperate irrational Soviet action or inadvertent escalation。

In other words， they knew that things may not happen exactly according to plan。

They knew that there was chance of accident that would lead to disaster or the initiation。

of nuclear war and that consideration of chance informed their decision making。

McNamara late in life they did a documentary on him and he talked about this， the crisis。

This is 50 years， 40 years， 45 years after it happened and he says， "I don't think。

the Cuban Missile Crisis was unique。 The Bay of Pigs， Berlin in 1961。

Cuba and then later events in the Middle East and Libya and。

so on all exhibit the truth of what I'll call McNamara's law。

McNamara's law is it is impossible to predict with the high degree of confidence what the。

effects of the use of military force will be because of the risks of accident， miscalculation。

misperception and inadvertence。

In my opinion this law ought to be inscribed above all the doorways in the White House and。

the Pentagon and it is the overwhelming lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis。 Again。

he's talking about military but we know that chance applies to non-military situations。

as well and the last implication is we've got these perspectives， we've got these models。

but we need to also account for chance。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P75：11_罗伯特·摩西案例.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

Earlier in this module， we emphasized the importance of organizational processes。

This model to that Graham Allison introduced us to。

And a master of organizational processes is Robert Moses。

He is a big figure in the field of power and influence and for good reason。

We'll understand more of that as we go through here。

But it's also a perfect place to start coming out of the Cuban Missile Crisis because one。

of his biggest sources of power was his mastery of organizational processes。

I want to tell you a quick story about that。 And this story comes from The Power Broker。

Much of what we know about Robert Moses comes from Robert Caro's book about him in the early， 70s。

This was Caro's first book。 Caro's gone on to write a four volume。

about to be five volume biography of Lyndon Johnson。

He writes essentially a thousand page book every ten years。 And his first was on Robert Moses。

So Moses was transportation commissioner in New York。

He was actually a commissioner of many different agencies around the New York area in the 30s， 40s。

50s and 60s。 Into the early 70s， Robert Moses held power in New York。 It is an amazing run。

People have called him the most influential figure in New York City in the 20th century。

And there's no example across the US of anyone in another city who held power as long as， he did。

So how did he hold power that long？ What can we understand about power from observing what Robert Moses did？

So a quick story from The Power Broker and especially tapping into this issue of organizational。

processes。 So one of Moses's responsibilities included the Triboro Bridge and Tunnel Authority。

So this was the early 30s。 This was the dawn of the use of authorities in the US。

And authorities were very focused on particular causes， particular needs。

You need a new bridge built？ Well， we'll organize an authority。

They can collect tolls on the bridge。 Once the bridge is paid off， the authority goes away。

So it was an independent borrowing authority。 And like the other ones。

it was for the purpose of collecting tolls on the bridges built and， managed。

And it lived separate from state agencies。

It was its own thing， but it was governed by the laws of New York state。

And Moses was happy to have this way to build a bridge， but Moses was a man of great ambition。

Moses wanted to build lots of bridges and lots of roads and lots of parkways。

He wanted to transform the infrastructure of the New York area and he was very， very good， at it。

So this was limiting that this thing was so focused and limited in time it would go away。

So he faced a number of problems。 He was also bound by the state laws。

He could only contract personnel in a certain way。 He couldn't hire people to do long term planning。

For example， he couldn't work them。 And over time。

he had to live by these state laws which didn't fit with the way he wanted， to work。

He was also limited to building bridges and roads that led to bridges。

So it's very focused on bridges。 That's kind of the whole concept of authority。

At least early in the US was around bridges。 There was one exception with the New York Harbor。

Otherwise， it was around these very precise infrastructure projects。

And then the last problem was that the bridges made too much money。

The tolls paid off the bridge in no time at all。 And the maintenance required for the bridge was pretty low。

And so the authority would be up， built the bridge， and then it went away。

And all this revenue that he could produce disappeared as well。

So he didn't have the resources to do what he wanted to do。

So what does he do about this？ How does he navigate these problems？ Here's Moses。

He's not an elected official。 In fact， he had run for office early on to realize he wasn't going to win office and。

took this other route to influence。 He had developed expertise in drafting laws。

He was well known in Albany。 He had a good track record。 He had gotten many things built and done。

And so he had the confidence of the lawmakers in Albany， the state capital of New York。

And so his trick was to change the rules， essentially。

He got the law regarding the powers of authorities and the nature of bonds changed。

He did this by literally writing legislation and Albany on it。 So under the new rules that he wrote。

the authority could retire and issue new bonds。 Under the new rules。

the authority could build projects not inconsistent with bridges。

So remember previously they were limited to bridges and roads leading to bridges now。

They can do anything they want to， as long as they're not inconsistent with bridges。

This is as liberal as one could write that。 And then finally。

the authority was not bound by the civil service rules that applied to， the government agencies。

So how do you do this？ How do you pull this off？ So Carol walks us through this amazing story of if the legislators and the public officials。

had known that he was doing this， they wouldn't have let it go。 Right？ So how did he do it？

He did a couple of things。 Mostly he surreptitiously dropped the verbiage into the back of the bill。

Or he would use a clause late in the bill that directly contradicted the obvious clause。

in the front of the bill in this direction。 So partly because he was good。

partly because they trusted him， he was able to do that。

But that wouldn't be sufficient if once it came to light they could change it。

That was a real trick here。 How could he keep it from being changed？

He did that because he wrote this not just into legislation。

He wrote it into the contracts that went with the bonds。 This is something he saw。

a capability he saw of authorities that no one else had seen。

that bonds once issued are contracts from the bond issuers to the bond holders。 It's a contract。

And contracts are protected by the Constitution of the United States。

Nobody can supersede a contract。 No state authority。

no nothing less than the Constitution can contradict a contract。 So once he wrote these specs。

these changes in regulations into the contracts associated， with the bonds。

he had a contract that the state officials had no power over whatsoever。

So that was a trick。 And then there was one last element。 And that was， well。

what about the fact that the funds go， they pay off the bridge too， quickly。 Therefore。

you issue the bonds， fine， but you've got to retire the bonds as soon as the thing， is done。

This was his last trick here。 He wrote， this was an example of his bearing deep in legislation terms that completely contradict。

the obvious one。 At the top of the legislation， the existence of the authority， it says。

same as it always， did。 Once this thing is paid off， it goes away。 It's buried deep。 It writes。

"The authority shall have power from time to time to refund any bonds by the， issuance of new bonds。

whether the bonds to be refunded have or have not matured and。

may issue bonds partly to refund bonds then outstanding and partly for any other corporate。

purpose。 Basically， he could do whatever he wants to。 He can issue bonds anytime he wants to。

And remember that in those bonds are these contracts that give him these rights that can't。

be superseded by local authorities or state authorities。 They're protected by the Constitution。

It is a remarkable power grab and it protected him。

It gave him the power essentially to do what he wanted to do for a lifetime。

It's really not much of an exaggeration to say for a lifetime he secured his power by。

mastering the organizational processes that govern the authority。

People didn't realize this for a while， but once he had done this， he didn't hold back。

And the mayor in New York at the time was Fierrilla Ligardia。

He had been working with Ligardia and he was going to go on to work with Ligardia。

And Ligardia of course was a very popular mayor。 But when he heard that Moses had started hiring people in a very different way。

hiring people， he wanted to， running them in a way that conflicted with municipal guidelines。

Ligardia wrote him。 And he said he basically protested and Moses said， "Look。

I'll take it up with my lawyers， and the bondholders。"， And Ligardia's going， "The bondholders。

" he says。 Ligardia says， "The mayor established that。 That's just the policy for the city。

And the authority bondholders have absolutely nothing to say。"， Moses's reply was quite succinct。

He said， "I think you'd better read the agreements and contracts。"， He had check-made Ligardia。

He had check-made Ligardia for his lifetime。 And with that power。

he went on to exercise extraordinary influence over the New York， area。 Thank you。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P76：12_摩西权力的来源.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

So if Robert Moses was the most influential person in New York City in the 20th century。

it's an extraordinary statement。 It might be worth understanding where his power came from。

So let's talk a little bit about where we believe that power came from。

Earlier in this module we introduced French and Raven's framework for the bases of social， power。

So let's just do a little checklist。 Where does Moses draw on any of these sources of social power？

Without reward power。 We know that he was able to reward politicians who went along with him。

landowners who went， along with him， contractors who went along with him。

He was famous for not profiting himself from his enterprises。 He only took a dollar in salary。

He had the good fortune of coming from a wealthy family。

But he made sure others profited from his enterprises。 So that is one source， coercive power。

One of the reasons Laguardia was reluctant to oppose him， he could have opposed him。

on other authorities。 Other commissions he could have punished him other places。

But Moses's tentacles went across so many places that if Laguardia opposed him one place。

he could hurt him in a second place。 And so this coercive power with Laguardia。

I mean with the mayor of New York， if you， could do this to the mayor of New York。

can imagine there's nobody that was immune to， it。 He definitely had coercive power。

Dropping to the bottom， he had legitimate power。 The offices he held gave him that people granted him deference by title alone。

As we talked about in the French and Raven framework， he had a referent power。

And this is an interesting one because you would think that a guy that had this many。

other sources of power might not worry about his image， might not worry about charisma。

But as we learned from Caro in his investigations to Moses， and is sometimes lost in people's。

understanding of Moses now， he was very diplomatic。

He curried favor with the media and he worried about things that you would be amazed at a。

guy like this would worry about。 For example， the card stock on invitations to an event that went out to media。

he worried， about the card stock。 He was very much worried about referent power。

And then finally expert power。 He was an expert in building these bridges and tunnels and infrastructure projects。

Municipalities from around the world would send their people to New York to study with， him。

He was recognized as an expert in building a construction， engineering and running the。

crews that needed to do that。 But that was only one source of his expert power。

What else was he an expert in？ In the story alone we know that he was an expert bill writer。

He was considered "the best bill writer in Albany。"。

He wasn't even a legislator and he was considered the best bill writer in Albany。

So he had this other source of expert power。 And then finally he helped develop the whole notion of financing through authorities。

He was an expert in financing in a way that basically jumped ahead of everybody else at， the time。

So he had these three sources of expert power。 Only one of which would have been enough to build a career on。

We would all hope to be as expert as he was in one of these domains and one of our lifetimes。

And he had it in three。 So you look across what is essentially a checklist for us and you see that he drew on every source。

of power multiple times in some cases。 And it begins to be not surprising that he was able to hold power as long as he did。

And this is something that we know about power。 That the more enduring power comes from those who draw from more sources。

And Moses had as enduring power as we've seen and it should be a surprise to us that he。

draws from all the sources that French and Raven suggest matter。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P77：13_从摩西获取的启示.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

So we've seen that Moses illustrates all five of the bases of social power that。

French and Raven talk about， but he is such a rich study in power and such an。

interesting character that we can understand other aspects of power through， him as well。

He illustrates some issues we've already talked about and some that。

we will talk about for the rest of the class。 So let's consider other factors。

that affected how much power and influence he wielded。 So we'll talk about， performance。

organizational process， agency and ethics。 First， performance。

Moses had access to these levers that he pulled only because of his reputation， built over decades。

We drop you into a story that happens kind of mid-career。

for him but we're skipping over decades of work and reputation building that he。

had gone through that kind of gave him that earned him the confidence of。

legislators and mayors that allowed him to secure the power and the。

processes that protect him for decades。 He was known as the man who got things。

done。 The newspaper talked about this， the man who got things done。 How would you。

like to have the reputation as the man or the woman who gets things done？ What a， fantastic thing。

I'm emphasizing it here because it's easy to look at levers of。

influence and on topics like we're talking about in this course and think。

that they are alternatives to performance。 There is no alternative to， performance。

Performance is the necessary part。 It is what you're。

levering with all of these tools of influence but without the performance。

you don't have anything to lever。 So Moses is actually a great example of that。

despite how good he was with levers of influence， despite how he captured。

organizational processes in ways that might feel pretty nefarious。 He had。

first and foremost performance。 There's a great quote from Jacob Lutsky who was a。

judge under four mayors in New York。 This is elsewhere in Caro。 I think it's， worth seeing in full。

Lutsky says you've got to understand every morning when a。

mayor comes to work there are a hundred problems that must be solved and a lot。

of them are so big and complex that they just don't seem susceptible to， solution。

And when he asks guys for solutions what happens？ Most of them can't， give him any。

And those that do come up with solutions， those solutions are so。

unrealistic or impractical or just plain stupid。 But you give a problem to Moses。

and overnight he's back in front of you with the solution all worked out down to， the last detail。

Drafts of speeches you can give to explain to the public。 Drafts of。

press releases for the newspapers。 Drafts of the state laws you'll need to get， passed。

Advice as to who should introduce the bills in the legislature and what， committees that you go to。

Drafts of any city council and board of estimate， resolutions you'll need。

If there are constitutional questions involved a list。

of the relevant precedents and a complete method of financing all spelled。

out。 He had solutions when no one else had solutions。 This is amazing right？ How。

much would you give to be this kind of employee？ This kind of leader？ This kind， of manager？

This is the reputation he had。 This was the basis of his power and we， shouldn't forget it。

Performance is the basis。 Performance is the necessary bit。 Second， organizational process。

We talked about this earlier in this module with， Allison's models of power。

This is the model two organizational process。 Fefert。

Jeff Fert for the organizational scholar puts it this way。 It is often the。

case that exercising power creates enemies who constitute a threat to your。

long-term organizational survival。 Thus in developing and exercising power is。

important to you structural mechanisms that institutionalize your power and。

diffuse responsibility for decisions and actions。 This institutionalization is。

great so it's not just you it's not just your ability to persuade people。 It is。

institutionalizing in the organizational processes your preferences and your， goals。

Given the nature of rules and structure what are the implications for。

you as a manager one is to recognize via Allison as Allison talks about that。

these processes are not always established in the best interest of the， organization。

They can come about because of private agendas competing interest。

They often just persist out of benign neglect so it's not like they're， optimized。

They are there for often haphazard reasons and so they are right。

for tweaking either towards the rational direction or your interest。

Hopefully the rational interest but they can be your interest within the。

organizations toward whatever goals you're trying to achieve。 The second。

implication is should be apparent now from from Moses in particular is that。

you shouldn't accept these processes as a given。 They are essentially cards that。

are dealt and redelked continuously。 You can and should influence the dealing。 Why。

take these as passive？ This is going to be a theme that we pick up on in a little。

more detail with Moses and then throughout the course don't accept， circumstances as fixed。

Don't be passive with regard to your environment and in。

particular this thing that so many neglect that this thing that people don't。

appreciate how influential they are。 Organizational processes， bureaucracy， don't。

neglect that as something that can be moved in the direction of your goal。 That。

takes us to agency a third theme in the Moses example。 This notion that rule。

breakers are especially influential。 Rodrigo Kanalas， a sociologist at Yale。

talks about how essentially they are for innovation。 He studies it in the。

micro credit environment and it's been talked about more broadly。 Fefra again。

says if you have all the power you want or need by all means not only follow the。

rules but encourage everyone else to do so too。 But if you are still traversing。

your path to power take all this conventional wisdom and quote rule。

following with the big grain of salt。 Fefra saying great for those in power of。

course you want people to live by the rules but if you're not in power you've。

got to challenge the rules because in general the rules are built to protect， those in power。

So as you're traversing your path to power as Fefra says you。

almost necessarily have to challenge the rules and there's some optimal amount of。

rule breaking that needs to be done。 So the definition of agency is to act to。

exert control over one's environment and we find that this is a vital。

characteristic of powerful people。 They actively shape the situations they face。

rather than passively accepting what they find。 This is stacking the deck。 This is。

not playing the cards your delt。 There's a time and place to play the cards your， delt。

There's a certain philosophy there that is helpful in some。

situations but we're actively encouraging stacking the deck here。 This is。

exercising agency in your environment。 Now hopefully you see that the cultivation。

and use of power is inextricably linked up with ethics。 You can't read the most。

example you can't hear about the most example without worrying a little bit。

about okay was that okay？ I mean in a lot of ways that wasn't okay and that's。

going to come up with every exercise of power。 We've just talked about agency。

How did you react when we talked about agency in that way？ Do you blanch a little， bit？

Are you uncomfortable？ I hope you are uncomfortable because it shouldn't be。

okay to go crashing through every wall and breaking every rule。 That's not。

probably the best course of action for you or your organization。 So there's always。

going to be this tension between exercising that much agency， between， capturing， influencing。

bending organizational processes and ethics。 And， we're raising it now。

We'll continue to discuss it through the rest of the course。

and if you're not a little uncomfortable we want you to be a little uncomfortable。

Something I like about Moses and one of the reasons we use the most of these。

examples is that it provokes us to think more deeply about what is okay and what。

is not okay as we cultivate and use power。 So an example from Moses's own。

life was a proposal that he made later in his career。 This kind of proposal came。

from a conviction that he had。 Carol puts it this way。 Robert Moses himself was。

certain he held the keys to the city's future。 That's amazing conviction right？

When you are certain you hold the keys to the city's future。 It licenses pretty。

much whatever you want to do。 One of the things he wanted to do and one of the。

first big projects he wasn't able to do was the cross Manhattan arterial。 So this。

road runs we're looking from west to east across Lower Manhattan here from the。

Hudson to the East River and that four， five， six lane elevated expressway is。

about where Halston Street is now。 So basically he wanted to divide Lower Manhattan。

about where Halston is which would have separated Soho， Tribeca， the financial。

district from the rest of the island and happily most people feel happily he。

wasn't able to do this but this is what he wanted to do。 This was his conviction。

This was the agency he wanted to exert。 How does that sit ethically？ How did he， know？

How does anyone know that that was the right thing to do？ So this raises a。

question about ends and means and this is going to be something we want you to。

always grapple with around power and we'll continue to talk about it。 The author。

Aldous Huxley put it this way。 The end cannot justify the means for the simple。

and obvious reason that the means employed determine the nature of the， ends。

So Huxley clearly had a position on this。 Moses had a different position。 Moses put it this way。

If the end doesn't justify the means what does？ So we want。

you to struggle。 What is your position on this？ How do you reckon out ends versus， means？

This is something you're going to have to grapple with as you cultivate and， use power。

President Obama in his first inaugural address put it this way。 He said。

power alone cannot protect us nor does it entitle us to do as we please。 Instead。

our power grows through its prudent use， emanates from the justice of our cause。

the force of our example， the tempering qualities of humility and restraint。 So。

this is one approach to the use of power。 These are some considerations to the。

cultivation and use of power that helps you navigate these ethical questions but。

you're going to have to come up with your own。 We don't want to just take in what。

Moses did or what Huxley says or what Obama says。 These are inputs for you。

developing your own ethical framework。 One closing thought a quote from a former， colleague of mine。

yeah， Jonathan Capel。 Capel says people often worry about， politics as a substitute for merit。

But if manipulating rules and working within， rules are keys to success and doing so is considered politics perhaps political。

ability is merit。 This is really turning the concerns about politics on its head。

Not only is politics not an alternative to performance， it is a source of， performance。

You can't have performance without some degree of， political maneuvering。

We see the consequences of high-end political， maneuvering in Moses。

It raises issues for us that in some case that are， inspiring。

In some cases are worrying but these are issues that we're going to。

navigate for the rest of our careers hopefully and for the rest of the course。

we'll be talking about how to do that。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P78：14_关系模块简介.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

Welcome back to Influence。

We want to kick it off with a little introduction and let you know where we're going。

This week is all about relationships。 One of the themes in the course is how much we get done through other people and therefore。

how much attention we need to pay to our relationships。 We're going to do it in two parts。

The first is on networks。 Very much focused on social networks。 The theory behind social networks。

The empirical work that's been done on social networks as well as some practical tips for。

cultivating those social networks and relationships。 In the second half we talk about coalitions。

Coalitions is one of my very favorite topics and both negotiations and influence for two， reasons。

One， they are very important。 It is a ubiquitous part of life。

an important influence tool to understand and to use。 And two。

they're not very well studied and not very often written about。

So we're going to spend half of week two talking about coalitions to tool you up for using them。

It's an important part of your relationships and one of the most important ways to influence。

organizations。 So here we go。 Here we go。 [ Silence ]。

沃顿商学院《实现个人和职业成功（成功、沟通能力、影响力）｜Achieving Personal and Professional Success》中英字幕 - P79：15_座位表练习.zh_en - GPT中英字幕课程资源 - BV1VH4y1J7Zk

Imagine registering for a conference and being asked not only to enter your name and address。

pay the registration fee， but also choose where you're going to sit at the GALA dinner。

I hadn't seen that before， but apparently some conferences do ask for that because this is a screen that I saw on a colleague's computer a few years ago when I dropped by to say hello over lunch。

She was registering for a conference and was having to choose which of these tables to see that at the dinner。

And it raises a question that is ubiquitous for us。

We have to decide who we affiliate with， who we spend time with。 It goes back to junior high days。

sitting at the cafeteria， but it's a question that all of us face in one way or another pretty much every day。

So let's just walk through this as an example and I want you to consider what you would do。

If you were registering for this conference and you were facing this screen。

you're coming in and you have some tables to choose from， how are you going to decide？

What are you even going to base it on？ How are you going to think about it？

So some people when asked this question， look for their friends essentially。

Look for people they know and they want to sit at a table with people they know。

That's a very reasonable natural consideration。 Some people think about， well。

I don't want to sit at a table and then no one else comes and sits behind me。

So I want to sit at a full table basically。 I don't want to be isolated。

And that's again a human instinct and understandable。

What other considerations might you bring to this？ Some folks think， well。

who do I need to work with at this conference？ Who might I have some interest in talking to？

It could not be a friend。 It might be someone of purely professional interest。

Let me go get a chance to sit at the table。 It may be the only chance I had to talk to them。

Also reasonable。 Some ambitious people think， well。

let me sit with people who I don't know or aren't like me or I won't have a chance to visit with in any other situation。

That is relatively rare but I do hear that response sometimes。

How would you do this？ How would you decide？ In many ways what we're going to talk about in today's lecture is this kind of consideration。

You're building relationships all the time。 Not formal hierarchical relationships but informal relationships。

Can we bring some structure to how we do that？ Can we bring some insight into the consequences of how we do it？

A lot of it will look like the decision on what you do here at the registration。

One suggestion I would offer here and we talk about this when we talk about this exercise with our daytime students is what about serendipity？

What about what would happen if you sat at the table with only one or two seats filled so that you're rolling the dice essentially on the next seven or eight people that come to sit at that table？

What would the consequence of that be？ It's riskier。 It may not be comfortable。

What do we know about the people that sit down after we sit at the table？

What do we know about the people who when they see our name they decide to sit at that table？

It's risky。 We don't know for sure but we can be certain that on average those people chose to sit there for a reason。

They wanted to sit next to us。 It's interesting that when we're making these calculations we sometimes don't realize other people are making the calculations about us。

It might be in our best interest to actually expose ourselves to that serendipity。

to expose ourselves to the possibility that someone else is going to sit down and offer us something entertainment or information that we wouldn't have had otherwise。

That's an idea we'll continue to play with over the course of the day but wanted to get it out there because it's not something that folks often think about when they make these kinds of decisions。

With that start let's dive into social networks。 [BLANK_AUDIO]。